At the opening of the Turkish Parliament in early October, the Nationalist Action Party (MHP) chairman Devlet Bahçeli, a known far-right ultranationalist and President Erdoğan’s main coalition partner, surprised onlookers by cheerfully shaking hands with several MPs representing the pro-Kurdish DEM Party.
The MHP and Bahçeli himself have been well known for their antagonism towards Turkey’s pro-Kurdish parties over the years and fiercely opposed a previous peace process initiated by Erdoğan’s government that lasted from 2009 until its collapse in 2013-14.
In a parliamentary speech in late October, Bahçeli confirmed suspicions of Turkey’s new Kurdish peace process and explained that it was a reboot by expressing openness to the idea of releasing Abdullah Öcalan, leader of the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) who has been imprisoned on İmralı Island in the Sea of Marmara since 1999. Engaged in a major conflict with the Turkish Armed Forces since the 1980s, the PKK is classified by Turkey as a terrorist organization.
What’s at stake at the new Kurdish peace process?
Devlet Bahçeli has called on Abdullah Öcalan to declare a full disarmament of the PKK in exchange for his possible release or a transition to house arrest. What the other Kurdish political leaders involved in the process stand to gain is less clear, but many experts believe the initiative is related to President Erdoğan’s ongoing push to change the Turkish Constitution, possibly allowing him to run for office once his current eligibility expires in 2028. Securing the DEM Party’s vote in the legislature for such a constitutional change would significantly boost the chances of the initiative succeeding.
The possibility of securing the release of the imprisoned Kurdish political leader Selahattin Demirtaş as part of the talks has been rumored but remains unconfirmed. Demirtaş, former co-chair of the DEM predecessor People’s Democratic Party (HDP), has been imprisoned in Edirne since 2016. In May of last year, Demirtaş was sentenced to an additional 42 years in prison by Turkish courts, and his release has been demanded by the Council of Europe on numerous occasions. Despite his imprisonment, Demirtaş remains influential in Kurdish politics in Turkey.
The main actors on the Kurdish side
DEM deputies Pervin Buldan and Sırrı Süreyya Önder visited Abdullah Öcalan at the İmralı prison on December 28. Recently deposed mayor of Mardin Ahmet Türk also joined the delegation. On January 22, a second İmralı visit by the delegation took place, this time without Türk.
Selahattin Demirtaş has been notably absent from the process thus far, although he was visited in prison by a DEM Party delegation on January 11. Former HDP co-chair Figen Yüksekdağ, also imprisoned since 2016, received a visit from the delegation as well.
Why now?
The timing of the new initiative has raised questions, given that Bahçeli’s first overtures in October occurred before the election of Donald Trump in early November and the fall of Bashar Assad in Syria in early December.
Due to the unique timing of the initiative, most early analysis of Bahçeli’s moves focused on its potential domestic repercussions, including gaining Kurdish support for a new constitution, sidelining the main opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP), and possibly courting Kurdish voters following disappointing election results for Erdoğan’s ruling coalition last March.
Since Assad’s fall and Trump’s election, a broader debate has unfolded over the initiative’s potential effect on regional politics. Turkey may use the initiative to rationalize a military invasion of Northern Syria, with the goal of defeating the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and People’s Defense Units (YPG). The YPG has links to the PKK and is classified by Turkey as a terrorist organization.
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With Donald Trump starting his second term and the United States’ commitment to its Kurdish allies in Northern Syria unclear, Turkey may launch an invasion to unseat the militias against the backdrop of democratic overtures to Kurds domestically.
Some analysts factor Öcalan’s advanced age in the timing of the initiative. The clock is ticking for Turkish officials to use the 75-year-old PKK founder as a bargaining chip to secure concessions such as support for a new constitution or disarmament of Kurdish militants in Iraq and Syria.
What has happened so far?
So far, the DEM Party delegation has paid Öcalan two visits—the most recent of which occurred on Wednesday (January 22). President Erdoğan has yet to make extensive remarks on the issue; he has thus far indicated support for Bahçeli’s initiative.
Nevertheless, the rebooted ‘peace process’ has taken place against the backdrop of an extensive crackdown on Kurdish politicians domestically over the past several months—all of whom were democratically elected in local elections in March 2024. In late October, just weeks after Bahçeli’s initiation of the new process, Istanbul’s Esenyurt district mayor Ahmet Özer was deposed and detained on alleged terror charges. The following week, three DEM Party mayors were deposed in the southeastern provinces of Mardin, Batman, and Şanlıurfa.
The process has been successful so far in sidelining the CHP, which has struggled to stake out a clear position on the new initiative, as Erdoğan’s coalition and the DEM Party delegation continue to move forward with the Öcalan talks.
What to expect?
Sources earlier this week indicated that Öcalan intends to call for a disarmament of the PKK militants on February 15, although this information remains unconfirmed by the DEM Party officials.
An announcement by Turkish officials regarding the details of a new constitution is expected at some point, although it remains a topic of speculation whether the draft will include concessions for the Kurds such as language rights and if the process will secure the release of figures like Demirtaş and Yüksekdağ.
Future announcements resulting from the process could also include details on how the PKK-linked Kurdish groups in Northern Syria, such as the YPG, might disarm or strike a deal with Damascus in order to integrate into the nascent Syrian Armed Forces in exchange for Turkish concessions.
While Turkey’s new Kurdish peace process stands the risk ending in a similar fate as the previous attempt, many still hold out hope for success.
Written for Medyascope by Leo Kendrick
